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The Power Issue In Public Sector
Grievance Arbitration
Roger I. Abrams*
. INTRODUCTION
The success of a public enterprise is partly a function of
the quality of its labor relations system. Periodic collective
bargaining may make media headlines,' but establishing and
successfully administering an arbitration mechanism to resolve
disputes arising under the collective bargaining agreement is
an equally important measure of achievement. Public manag-
ers and labor organizations representing public employees
have borrowed the private sector's method for resolving dis-
putes in an expeditious and peaceful manner.2 Today, the use
of a multi-step grievance procedure capped by a final and bind-
ing arbitration process is commonplace in the public sector3
and, in some instances, is mandated by statute.4 Surprisingly,
however, commentators have given little attention to the opera-
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University.
1. Periodic collective bargaining is also the focus of most of the literature
in the public sector labor relations field. See, e.g., Edwards, The Emerging Duty
to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 McH. L. REV. 885 (1973); Summers, Public
Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156 (1974).
2. Professor Tim Bornstein has offered an interesting explanation for the
public sector's adoption of private sector methods of dispute resolution. In the
1970's, public sector employers and unions hired practitioners trained in the
private sector to administer their labor relations activities. "As a result, these
advocates quite consciously tended to mold the new and emerging institutions
of the public sector in the familiar image of the private sector." Bornstein, Leg-
acies of Local Government Collective Bargaining in the 1970s, 31 LAB. L.J. 165,
166 (1980).
3. As of 1975, over 70% of all public sector collective bargaining agree-
ments contained final and binding arbitration provisions. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BULLETIN No. 1833, GRIEVANCE AND ARBITRA-
TION PROCEDURES IN STATE AND LOCAL AGREEMENTS 18, 40 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as BULLETIN 1833].
4. Grievance arbitration provisions are required to be included in collec-
tive bargaining agreements under the Federal Service Labor-Management and
Employees Relations Law, 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a) (1) (Supp. IV 1980), and under
state statutes in Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.210 (1981); Florida, FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 447.401 (West 1981); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.70(1) (West
Supp. 1982); and Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.903 (Purdon Supp.
1982-83).
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tion of public grievance arbitration systems, despite their im-
portance in the public sector.5
In many ways, the practice and procedures of public sector
grievance arbitration mirror those of its private sector progeni-
tor. Union and management select a neutral arbitrator on an
ad hoc basis through the offices of an outside agency, such as
the American Arbitration Association. The arbitrator conducts
an informal hearing, receiving evidence through oral testimony
and documentary proof. Parties customarily submit posthear-
ing briefs, after which the arbitrator prepares an opinion set-
ting forth reasons in support of a final and binding award
resolving the dispute.6
In at least one important respect, however, public sector
grievance arbitration is distinctive. Public employers almost
routinely question the arbitrator's jurisdiction to hear the mat-
ter in dispute or the arbitrator's power to issue an award or
remedy in favor of the union. This Article refers to these vari-
ous attacks on the authority and capacity of the public sector
arbitrator as the "power issue." Private employers, of course,
raise similar issues in private sector arbitration, but, as is ap-
parent from even a cursory examination of published deci-
sions,7 public employers raise the power issue far more
frequently.8
5. Scholars generally have focused on court decisions in analyzing public
sector arbitration issues, see, e.g., Craver, The Judicial Enforcement of Public
Sector Grievance Arbitration, 58 TEx. L. REv. 329 (1980), but they have not ex-
amined the primary data of arbitration opinions. While judicial decisions are of
critical importance in the development of the law of the public sector labor
agreement, judges' opinions do not always reflect an informed understanding of
the actual operation of dispute resolution systems. Academics have made little
use of the growing number of reported public sector arbitration opinions. See
infra note 7.
6. It is important in discussing public sector dispute resolution to distin-
guish between "interest arbitration," the process used to resolve disputes aris-
ing from the negotiation of a new contract, and "grievance arbitration," the
process used to resolve disputes arising during the term of an existing collec-
tive agreement, generally involving the interpretation and application of the
provisions of that agreement. For a discussion of the grievance arbitrator's de-
cisional role, see generally Abrams, The Nature of the Arbitral Process: Sub-
stantive Decision-Making in Labor Arbitration, 14 U.C.D. L. REV. 551 (-1981).
For an evaluation of the various forms of binding interest arbitration, see gen-
erally J. STERN, C. RHEMUS, J. LOEWENBERG, H. KAsPAR & B. DENNIS, FINAL-OF-
FER ARBrrRATION (1975).
7. The Bureau of National Affairs publishes a representative sample of
public sector arbitration opinions in its Labor Arbitration Reports series; the
Commerce Clearinghouse does likewise in its Labor Arbitration Awards series.
8. For example, a review of the arbitration opinions published in volume
76 of the Labor Arbitration Reports (BNA) shows that arbitrability claims ap-
pear more than three times as frequently in public sector decisions as in pri-
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This Article explores the possible reasons for the preva-
lence of the power issue in public sector grievance arbitration
and evaluates the impact of the power issue on the arbitration
process and on public enterprise in general.9 First, however,
the Article examines briefly how public employers have raised
the power issue in arbitration. For purposes of discussion,
management's arguments on the power issue are divided into
four categories: 1) substantive and procedural arbitrability;
2) reserved managerial prerogatives; 3) controlling external
law; and 4) limitations on remedial power.
H. THE POWER ISSUE
A. SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ARBITRABILITY
Public employers frequently contest whether the matter
brought to arbitration by public sector unions is substantively
or procedurally arbitrable.O Public sector collective bargaining
agreements often contain provisions expressly excepting cer-
tain disputes from the grievance and arbitration procedure,
sometimes excluding only specific disputes," while other times
excluding a broader class of disputes through generalized lan-
guage.12 In a substantive challenge, the public employer at-
tacks the authority of the arbitrator by arguing that the parties'
vate sector decisions. More than half of the public sector cases reported in
volume 76 contain one or more versions of the power issue. See 76 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) (1981).
9. For purposes of this analysis, federal, state, and local arbitration exper-
iences are not distinguished, although obvious differences exist among them.
For a recent discussion of the baroque intricacies of federal sector grievance ar-
bitration, see generally Comment, Federal Sector Arbitration Under the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 857 (1980). Similarly, the
"public employer" is discussed as a single entity, although it typically is di-
vided into executive and legislative branches. See J. GRODIN, D. WoLLETr & I.
ALLEYNE, CoLLEcnVE BARGAINING IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 70-86 (3d ed. 1979).
10. Fifteen years ago, an arbitrator noted the "high incidence of basic arbi-
trability issues" in discussing the then relatively new phenomenon of public
sector grievance arbitration. Rehmus, The Neutral in Public Employment Dis-
putes, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTIETH
ANNUAL MEETING, THE ARBITRATOR, THE NLRB AND THE CouRrs 260, 278 (D.
Jones ed. 1967).
11. For example, the collective agreement between the Flint, Michigan
Board of Education and the Teachers' Association excluded disputes concern-
ing the discharge of probationary teachers from arbitration. Flint Bd. of Educ.
v. United Teachers, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1080, 1081 (1981) (Roumell, Arb.).
12. For example, the collective agreement between Orange County, Cali-
fornia and the County Employees Association excluded from arbitration
"[m]atters which have other means of appeal." County of Orange, Cal. v. Or-
ange County Employees Ass'n, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1040, 1041 (1981) (Tamoush,
Arb.).
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collective bargaining agreement excludes the issue raised by
the union from the class of arbitrable issues, and that conse-
quently the parties did not intend to resolve the dispute
through arbitration. For the most part, arbitrators have
respected contract language placing substantive limitations on
their arbitral power.13
Procedural arbitrability claims typically contest the timeli-
ness of the filing and processing of the grievance,' 4 or the ade-
quacy of the written statement of the grievance.15 Arbitrators
usually have rejected technical procedural objections on
grounds commonly used in private sector cases.16 Arbitrators
13. In Flint Bd. of Educ., 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 1080, the Teachers' Associ-
ation sought to arbitrate the question whether the Board of Education had
complied with the teacher evaluation procedure set forth in the collective
agreement. The arbitrator accepted the Board of Education's argument that
the dispute was excluded from arbitration, ruling that this challenge to the
evaluation procedure was so interwoven with the excluded issue of the termi-
nation of the probationary teacher that he had no jurisdiction over the matter.
Id. at 1085-86. But see Veterans Admin. Medical Center v. American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees, Local 1119, 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 725, 728 (1981) (Weiss, Arb.);
Social Sec. Admin. U.S. Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. American Fed'n of Gov't Employ-
ees, Local 3347, 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 136, 138-39 (1981) (Atleson, Arb.).
In County of Orange, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 1040, the Union brought to ar-
bitration a grievance claiming discrimination against an employee on the basis
of sexual preference. The public employer argued that the dispute was beyond
the substantive jurisdiction of the arbitrator because other means of appeal
were open to the aggrieved individuaL Id. at 1042. Although the parties had in-
cluded a list of proscribed bases for unequal treatment in their agreement's
non-discrimination clause, they did not mention homosexuality. Id. The arbi-
trator concluded that the matter was not arbitrable, ruling that other state and
federal forums were available to hear a complaint raising this substantive is-
sue. Id. at 1043-44. See also Long Beach Naval Shipyard v. Federal Employees
Metal Trades Council, 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 63, 66 (1980) (Gentile, Arb.) (propri-
ety of ship commanding officer's decision not within scope of arbitrator's
authority).
14. See, e.g., Mare Island Naval Shipyard v. Federal Employees Trades
Council, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 462, 465 (1981) (Aller, Arb.); Illinois Dept. of Per-
sonnel v. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, Local 2000, 74
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 306, 307 (1980) (Belcher, Arb.); Buffalo Bd. of Educ. v. Buffalo
Teachers Fed'n, 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 921, 922 (1977) (Dennis, Arb.).
15. For example, an arbitrator rejected a public employer's attack on the
sufficiency of the written statement on the grievance form in Nassau County
School Bd. v. Nassau Teachers Ass'n, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1044 (1981) (Swee-
ney, Arb.). The arbitrator stated that "grievance forms are customarily not
treated by arbitrators with the same cold eye a judge might consider pleadings
within a court of law." Id. at 1045. Cf. NLRB v. National Labor Relations Bd.
Union, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 450, 456 (1981) (Gentile, Arb.) ("[t]hough grievance
filings are generally not read in narrow perspective," employer successfully
challenged the sufficiency of the grievance).
16. Citing a series of private sector decisions, an arbitrator ruled that a
teacher's grievance objecting to the denial of a leave request was timely filed in
Geneseo Community Unit School Dist. No. 288 v. Geneseo Educ. Ass'n, 75 Lab.
Arb..(BNA) 131 (1980) (Berman, Arb.). According to the arbitrator, although
f Vol. 67:261
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have not drawn any distinctions between private sector and
public sector arbitration in addressing procedural arbitrability
claims.
B. RESERVED MANAGERIAL PREROGATIVES
The public employer also raises the power issue by appeal-
ing to specific provisions in the collective bargaining agreement
that expressly reserve managerial discretion. The employer ar-
gues that a reserved prerogatives clause written in sweeping
terms allocates to public management the exclusive right to de-
cide matters of the same nature as those in dispute.17 Even in
the absence of a broadly worded management prerogatives
clause, management can claim that the language of particular
contract provisions reserves to it the discretion to make specific
decisions regarding the subject raised in the grievance.18 The
public employer thus requests the arbitrator to respect the
terms of the parties' agreement by denying the grievance on its
merits.' 9
Public management tends to read management rights
clauses quite broadly. Generally, public sector arbitrators have
rejected extreme interpretations by management,20 refusing to
the grievance was initiated after the contract's 18-day period of limitations from
the date of denial of her leave request, the "event" grieved was the nonpay-
ment of salary for unauthorized leave which fell within the 18-day period. Id.
at 133. See also Elizabeth Forward School Dist. v. Elizabeth Forward Educ.
Ass'n, 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 181, 185-87 (1981) (Hays, Arb.).
17. See, e.g., U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees, Local 2724, 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 633, 634 (1981) (Grossman,
Arb.); Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewage Dist. v. American Fed'n of State,
County & Mun. Employees, Local 366, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1220, 1226 (1981)
(Mukamal, Arb.); City of Rochester, Mich. v. City of Rochester Police Officers,
Local 3075, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 295, 299 (1981) (Lipson, Arb.).
18. See, e.g., Willoughby-Eastlake City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Wil-
loughby-Eastlake Teachers Ass'n, 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 21, 24 (1980) (Ipavec,
Arb.); City of Tampa, Fla. v. Hillsborough County Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc.,
74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1169, 1170 (1980) (Wahl, Arb.); Lenawee County Rd.
Comm'n v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local 14723, 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 249, 250
(1979) (Daniel, Arb.).
19. Unlike the arbitrability arguments, the managerial prerogatives version
of the power issue does not contest directly the arbitrator's authority to hear
the matter in dispute. The practical effect of the reserved management rights
claim, however, is the same: to deny the arbitrator's power and authority to
review the actions of the public employer. Thus, the managerial prerogatives
claim can be considered an alternate version of the power issue. See, e.g., Lake
Superior State College Bd. of Control v. Lake Superior State College Faculty
Ass'n, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 109, 112-13 (1980) (Brooks, Arb.).
20. For example, in Board of Public Utilities, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 446, 449
(undated) (Grether, Arb.), the public employer argued that it could make uni-
lateral changes in established working conditions "in the interest of economy
1982]
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give a management rights clause an interpretation that negates
other contractual provisions.2 1
C. CONTROLLING EXTERNAL LAW
The public employer also raises the power issue in arbitra-
tion by invoking public statutes, ordinances, and court deci-
sions that are claimed to control the outcome of the matter in
dispute. Public law external to the collective bargaining agree-
ment has implications for the operation of every public em-
ployer's personnel system.22 In these cases, management
attempts to persuade the arbitrator to accept an external stat-
ute, regulation, or judicial pronouncement as determinative of
and efficiency" under its management rights clause, as long as the condition
was not embodied in the collective agreement. The arbitrator found that the
practice in question, providing employees with free coffee, had existed for ten
years and had been cited by the employer during negotiations as a "fringe ben-
efit worth at least 3.38133 cents per hour to each employee." Id. at 450. Grant-
ing the grievance, the arbitrator ruled that the management rights clause did
not give the public employer the right to decrease the compensation package.
Id. See also City of Greenfield v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 695, 77
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 8, 11 (1981) (Yaffe, Arb.); State of Alaska v. Alaska Pub. Em-
ployees Ass'n, 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 459, 467-68 (1979) (Hauck, Arb.).
21. Occasionally, the public employer will join an arbitrability claim with a
complementary management rights argument. For a particularly creative ex-
ample of such a strategy, see Peters Township School Dist. v. Peters Township
Educ. Ass'n, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 68 (1981) (Hauman, Arb.). The school board
argued that a grievance protesting its failure to inform a school nurse of derog-
atory memos placed in her personnel file was untimely, because it was not filed
"within thirty (30) days after the occurrence of the event giving rise to the
grievance" as required by the contract. Id. at 70. Alternatively, the school
board relied on the contractual reservation of rights "to manage the educa-
tional process ... and to direct the working forces" as precluding substantive
arbitral jurisdiction over any matter implicating these rights. Id. at 69. As to
the merits, the employer proffered the generous managerial prerogatives clause
to support its absolute right to determine what was or was not a derogatory
memo. Id. at 70. This triple-barrelled power issue attack failed, but the pri-
mary remedy sought by the grievant, that the evaluation resulting from consid-
eration of these derogatory memos be removed from her personnel file, was
ruled to be beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. Id. at 71.
22. For example, in Grand Ledge Bd. of Educ. v. Eaton County Educ.
Ass'n, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 81, 82-83 (1980) (McDonald, Arb.), the union grieved
the school board's position that the Michigan Open Meetings Law required that
third-step grievances be heard in an open session. The school board argued
that it was "under a statutory mandate to conduct meetings in compliance with
the" state's sunshine law. Id. at 84. The contract's grievance procedure ex-
pressly called for a closed meeting. Id. at 83. Noting that the Open Meetings
Law allowed a public body to meet in closed session on an individual personnel
matter when the employee so requests, the arbitrator considered the ratified
contract clause calling for closed sessions as a collective request sufficient to
trigger the statutory exception to the open meeting requirement. Id. at 85-86.
Grievance arbitrators, however, are not always this skillful in finessing external
law issues.
[Vol. 67:261
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the grievance dispute.23
While arbitrators in the public sector generally have con-
sidered the impact of external law,24 they have not always
agreed with management's reading of how that law affects the
resolution of the grievance dispute.25 Arbitrators will resort to
external law to interpret ambiguous contract references on the
assumption that the parties were aware of the statutory context
in which they negotiated their agreement.2 6
D. LIMrATIONS ON REMEDIAL POWER
One final way in which public management raises the
power issue is by arguing that the arbitrator lacks the remedial
authority to order the relief sought by the union. For example,
in a case involving a school board's refusal to renew the con-
tract of a probationary teacher, management may contend that
the arbitrator lacks the power to order the reinstatement of the
employee, since ordering the teacher's continued employment
would preempt the school board's exclusive power under state
law to award tenure.27 In other cases, public management may
argue that the grievance arbitrator does not have the power to
modify a disciplinary penalty unless the contract expressly
23. See, e.g., Clinton County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Fraternal Order of Police,
Capitol City Lodge No. 141, 81-2 LAB. ARB. AwARDs (CCH) 8495 (1981) (Kru-
ger, Arb.); Board of Educ., School Dist. No. 220 v. Teavis High School Fed'n of
Teachers, Local 1951, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 158, 159 (1981) (Berman, Arb.); City of
Scranton, Pa. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, Lodge 2462, 74 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 514, 518 (undated) (Avins, Arb.). Sometimes both parties seek guidance
from the arbitrator as to the meaning of external law. See, e.g., Board of Educ.,
School Dist. No. 220 v. Teavis High School Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1951, 76 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 158, 159 (1981) (Berman, Arb.).
24. But see Cuyahoga County, Ohio Welfare Dep't v. American Fed'n of
State, County & Mun. Employees, Local 1746, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 729, 731-32
(1981) (Siegel, Arb.) (arbitrator will not consider state law).
25. See, e.g., City of Little Rock, Ark. v. International Ass'n of Firefighters,
Local 34, 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 199, 202 (1981) (Bernstein, Arb.); City of Wyan-
dotte v. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, Local 894, 74 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 2, 4 (1980) (McDonald, Arb.); City of Detroit v. Senior Accts., Ana-
lysts & Appraisers Ass'n, 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 717, 722 (1979) (Daniel, Arb.). In
fact, it is not unusual for a public sector union to prevail if management fails to
comply with controlling external law. See, e.g., VS Evansville State Hosp. v.
American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, Council 62, 74 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 1090, 1091-92 (1980) (Deitsch, Arb.); Marine Corps. Logistics Base v.
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1482, 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 396, 396-97
(1980) (Mazurak, Arb.).
26. See, e.g., Ellenville Cent. School Dist. v. Ellenville Teachers Ass'n, 74
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1221, 1222 (1980) (Seitz, Arb.).
27. See Fraser, Grievance Arbitration and the Non-Reappointment of Non-
Tenured Teachers: The Massachusetts Experience, 28 LAB. LJ. 763, 765-66
(1977).
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grants that power to the neutral.2 8
Public management also has questioned whether an arbi-
trator has the power to order the public employer to pay mone-
tary damages to the grievant.2 9 Public management has taken
the position that statutes forbid the issuance of a "make whole"
remedy.30 Arbitrators generally have considered statutory limi-
tations on their remedial power, but have divided over whether
to recognize these limitations as controlling.3 1
I. THE SOURCES OF THE POWER ISSUE
This Article has addressed the variety of forms in which
management has raised the power issue in public sector griev-
ance arbitration. What can explain its ubiquity? On the most
basic level, public management may see the power issue as a
"winner" argument. A party to an adversarial proceeding natu-
rally will raise its best arguments in the hope of prevailing in
the forum. If public management can persuade the arbitrator
that he or she lacks the power to hear the case or grant the re-
quested relief, the argument obviously will prove useful. 32 This
bare utilitarian hypothesis, however, cannot account for the
greater frequency of the power issue in public sector cases.
Private sector management certainly would assert power issue
28. An arbitrator rejected such a claim in Township of Dover v. American
Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, Local 2279, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1251,
1253 (1981) (Gray, Arb.).
29. See, e.g., Warner Robins Air Logistics Center v. American Fed'n of
Gov't Employees, Local 987, 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 217, 223 (1980) (Clarke, Arb.).
30. In Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 217, Arbi-
trator Clarke interpreted the Federal Back Pay Act of 1966, 5 U.S.C. § 5596,
which sets forth those situations in which back pay can be paid because'of un-
justified personnel action. Id. at 223. The Arbitrator ruled that back pay would
be due only to those employees who could show that they would have received
the overtime in question had the Agency complied with the collective bargain-
ing agreement. Id. at 223-24. Cf. United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 405-07
(1976) (government employees not entitled to backpay for wrongful employee
classification). See generally Frazier, Labor Arbitration in the Federal Service,
45 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 712, 722-26 (1977) (Federal Labor Relations Council re-
view of arbitration awards of back pay under Back Pay Act).
31. Compare Garden Grove Unified School Dist. v. Garden Grove Educ.
Ass'n, 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 274, 276-77 (1979) (Rule, Arb.) (state education code
controlling) with United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter Carri-
ers, 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1174, 1181-83 (1979) (Barrett, Arb.) (civil service com-
mission policy not controlling).
32. The reported cases do not support the assumption that the power issue
is a sure "winner." Arbitrators regularly dismiss objections based on proce-
dural arbitrability and remedial power grounds. Claims based on reserved
managerial prerogatives, external law and substantive arbitrability enjoy a
greater measure of arbitral acceptance, but hardly universal success.
[Vol. 67:261
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arguments routinely if such contentions had some chance of
success.
One possible explanation for the greater frequency of the
power issue in the public sector is that the typical public sector
arbitration clause is usually drawn more narrowly than the typ-
ical private sector arbitration clause. The standard private sec-
tor arbitration clause customarily bestows jurisdiction on the
arbitrator to resolve all disputes concerning the interpretation
or application of the provisions of the agreement. By compari-
son, a public sector arbitration clause often contains exceptions
to the arbitration promise, either by specifically listing arbitra-
ble issues or by excluding certain matters from the process. 33
While not fully elastic, public sector clauses delimiting the
scope of arbitration do give public management a firmer foun-
dation upon which to construct its substantive arbitrability
argument.34
Similarly, public sector collective bargaining agreements
generally contain managerial prerogatives clauses couched in
plenary language that can support legitimate arguments based
on reserved power.35 Although private sector collective agree-
ments often contain management rights provisions phrased in
similarly sweeping terms, arbitrators have not applied the
clauses as broadly as their actual language might permit.36 In
the current inchoate state of public sector arbitral jurispru-
dence, however, the full import of management rights clauses
remains unclear. Thus, since an expansive reading of such
clauses has not yet been rejected in the public sector context,
public managers will continue to assert the reserved rights ver-
sion of the power issue as long as they have reason to believe
that it might succeed.
33. Almost 27% of the sample public sector arbitration provisions studied
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in 1975 contained significant exclusions from
the arbitration procedure. BULLETiN 1833, supra note 3, at 38.
34. Contract content, however, does not explain fully the frequency of pro-
cedural arbitrability claims in public sector cases, since public sector and pri-
vate sector agreements typically contain similar time limits and other
procedural requirements.
35. The enabling collective bargaining legislation often mandates reserva-
tion of managerial prerogatives over a broad class of issues. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C.
§ 7106 (Supp. IV 1980). Sometimes public management will point directly to
statutory references as the source of its discretionary power even though such
power is not expressly reserved in the terms of the parties' agreement. See,
e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. W. Regional Office v. National Border
Patrol Council, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 1613, 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
638, 640 (1981) (Weckstein, Arb.).
36. See F. ELKOumi & E. ELKouRi, How ARBrrRATION WomRs 412-550 (3d ed.
1973).
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Alternatively, the immaturity of public sector labor rela-
tions may explain the frequency of the power issue in public
sector arbitration. While the organization of public employees
dates back to the early nineteenth century, widespread collec-
tive bargaining in the public sector arose only in the 1960's.3 7
Final and binding arbitration as a mechanism for resolving
grievance disputes in the public sector was not generally ac-
cepted until the 1970's. By comparison, private sector arbitra-
tion was a deeply rooted phenomenon by the 1940's and was
virtually enshrined as labor-management orthodoxy by the
Supreme Court in 1960 in the Steelworkers' Trilogy.3 8  The
power issue, therefore, is arguably a characteristic of the in-
fancy, or at best the adolescence, of the dispute resolution
mechanism.
Public managers, having agreed to binding arbitration-
perhaps under statutory compulsion-may remain uncertain as
to its scope and skeptical as to its benefits.3 9 How can an out-
sider appreciate the real problems faced by the insiders? Will
the arbitrator resolve the dispute in a manner consistent with
management's operational needs? Why is this system of dis-
pute resolution preferable to the old one, where public manage-
ment had the last word? While private sector grievance
arbitration arguably substitutes for the costly in-term strike,
public union self-help during the term of a collective agreement
is universally illegal and, in fact, rarely occurs. Understanda-
bly, public management has difficulty identifying what it re-
ceives in exchange for its promise to arbitrate.4 0 Uncertainty as
37. See Project: Collective Bargaining and Politics in Public Employmen4
19 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 887, 893-896 (1972).
38. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mg. Co., 363 U.S. 564
(1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
39. It might be added that some public managers are unskilled in the tech-
niques of arbitration. They have been accused of lacking "sufficient expertise
and experience" at the negotiating table, see, e.g., Bierman, Freedom of Con-
tract and Public Sector Labor Relations, 12 RuT. I.U. 513, 537 (1981), and of not
being motivated to meet 'the militant union challenge." Shaw & Clark, The
Practical Difference Between Public and Private Collective Bargaining, 19
U.C.L-A. L. REV. 867, 873 (1972).
40. While told that arbitration brings peace and harmony to the public sec-
tor workplace, public management sees only a new set of disputes brought on
by the unionization of its employees and by the establishment of a grievance
and arbitration system. The promise of enhanced productivity and boosted mo-
rale may appear to be the phantom pot of gold. What is clearly visible, how-
ever, is a final and binding order of a grievance arbitrator reached through a
risk-laden process of review of management's action.
By comparison, the public sector union readily can identify what it receives
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to the scope of arbitration, as well as doubt as to its value,
breeds managerial resistance to this comparatively new pro-
cess, which manifests itself in attacks on the capacity of the ar-
bitral institution.41
A third possible explanation for the pervasiveness of the
power issue in the public sector is the complex legal super-
structure within which the public labor relations system has
developed. Consider, for example, the perplexing legal envi-
ronment that a school board faces. Although bound by a prom-
ise to arbitrate contained in a collective bargaining agreement
with its teachers, the board also is controlled by a myriad of
state statutes governing teacher contracts, tenure, minimum
school days, etc.42 As a public body, the school board must
comply with all existing legal regulations, not merely those em-
bodied in its collective agreement with the union.4 3 The board
owes an independent duty to its constituency to fulfill all its
public obligations. In arbitration, the board faces the risk that
the neutral will resolve the grievance dispute in a vacuum, de-
void of external law considerations, or will misread those legal
from the arbitration undertaking-a final and binding adjudication of rights by
a neutral to the controversy. If management's action is upheld, the union has
suffered no added detriment other than the transaction costs of the arbitration
process. Without arbitration, a union is left with the choice of accepting man-
agement's decision, or seeking relief through the cumbersome civil service or
civil court systems. The availability of arbitration should force the government
employer to respond more meaningfully to union complaints in the grievance
procedure. While public management can still simply answer "no" through the
steps of the grievance procedure, the ultimate availability of an arbitrator who
can say "yes" should cause management to evaluate the merits of a union
claim at an earlier stage of the dispute.
41. The New York Court of Appeals reflected this mistrust of the public
sector grievance arbitration process in Acting Superintendent of Schools v.
United Liverpool Faculty Ass'n, 42 N.Y.2d 509, 513, 369 N.E.2d 746, 749, 399
N.Y.S.2d 189, 192 (1977):
In the field of public employment, as distinguished from labor relations
in the private sector, the public policy favoring arbitration-of recent
origin-does not yet carry the same historical or general acceptance,
nor ... has there so far been a similar demonstration of the efficacy of
arbitration as a means for resolving controversies in government
employment.
Id.
42. The school board also must comply with constitutional strictures in
personnel matters. See Finkin, The Limits of Majority Rule in Collective Bar-
gaining, 64 MiNN. L. REV. 183, 239-73 (1980).
43. 'The distinction between the public and private sector cannot be mini-
mized .... The employer in the private sector is constrained only by investors
who are most concerned with the return for their investment whereas the pub-
lic employer must adhere to the statutory enactments which control the opera-
tion of the enterprise." Pennsylvania Lab. Rel. Bd. v. State College Area School
Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 499-500, 337 A.2d 262, 264 (1975).
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regulations to the detriment of the school board. By raising the
power issue, the public school board seeks to avoid the poten-
tial constraint of an award that might bind it to a course of ac-
tion inconsistent with what it perceives to be its other
obligations under the law.44
While all the reasons discussed so far probably explain, to
some extent, the prevalence of the power issue in public sector
arbitration proceedings, a more fundamental explanation must
be considered. The power issue may reflect the basic conun-
drum of public sector labor relations: How can an elected pub-
lic official share public power?45 In the first instance, the very
process of public sector collective bargaining with a labor or-
ganization raises the same basic question.46 Public sector bar-
gaining differs from private sector labor relations essentially
because the employer is an elected governmental body, rather
44. Courts generally will vacate an arbitration award that ignores or mis-
reads external law. See Craver, supra note 5, at 348-50. Public management,
however, would not be deterred from raising the external law version of the
power issue in arbitration by the availability of ultimate vindication in court.
The failure to raise the issue in arbitration may constitute a waiver of rights.
Id. at 345 n.82. In addition, the transaction costs of perfecting an appeal are
high and court review involves a delay in the implementation of management
action. Therefore, public management will assert the power issue before the ar-
bitrator to avoid the necessity of litigation.
45. Sometimes this question is phrased in terms of the indivisible nature
of government sovereignty, "an article of faith, not capable of being empirically
tested." Feuille, Selected Benefits and Costs of Compulsory Arbitration, 33 IN-
DUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 64, 66 (1979).
46. To this day, public sector collective bargaining is unauthorized in a
number of jurisdictions without enabling legislation. See, e.g., Commonwealth
of Va. v. County Bd., 217 Va. 558, 578-79, 232 S.E.2d 30, 43 (1977). Some observ-
ers have suggested that public sector bargaining is incompatible with the dem-
ocratic process. See R. SUMMERS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND PuBLIc BENEFIT
CONFERRAL: A JURISPRUDENTIAL CRITIQUE 3-9 (1976); Wellington & Winter, The
Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employmen 78 YALE L.J. 1107, 1123
(1969). While the era when the organization of public sector employees was
considered un-American may have passed, the belief lingers that the activities
of public sector unions are contrary to the public interest.
There is nothing new about taxpayer resistance to taxes or to tax-
payer complaints about public employees. What may be quite new,
however, is that hard times have created need for a villain; the taxpay-
ers' poorly focused, half-articulated anxiety over rising costs of living,
rising unemployment, and the problems of modern life are being fo-
cused sharply on a visible, slowly moving target: public employees and
public employee collective bargaining.
Bornstein, Perspectives on Change in Local Government Collective Bargaining,
28 LAB. L.J. 431, 440 (1977). See Cunningham, Labor-Management Relations in
the Federal Sector: Democracy or Paternalism, 31 LAB. L.J. 636, 643-44 (1980);
Weitzman, The Effect of Economic Restraints on Public Sector Collective Bar-
gaining: The Lessons of New York City, 2 EmPL REL. J. 286, 304-06 (1977).
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than a private entrepreneur 4 7 One would expect that public
sector grievance arbitration, as a product of that bargaining
process, would be affected by the fact that one party is a gov-
ernmental body. The prevalence of the power issue may be the
consequence of transplanting a labor relations dispute resolu-
tion mechanism developed in the private sector into the dis-
tinctively different public sector environment.4 8
Like their private sector counterparts, public sector bar-
gainers leave gaps in their collective agreements. Some rules
for ordering the public sector workplace are not expressed in
the text of the parties' agreements; others are expressed in am-
biguous language either by design or by inadvertance.4 9 The
grievance arbitrator must determine the parties' intent, even if
the language of their agreement provides no clear direction.5 0
While public managers may have adjusted to the process of bi-
lateral ordering involved in periodic collective bargaining, the
interstitial and supplementary contract-writing process inher-
ent in grievance arbitration 5' presents yet another challenge to
the authority of the public employer. Although public officials
may be willing to live with the product of their own negotiation,
they may be more reluctant to accede to a process wherein an
outsider to the collective arrangement draws a "bargain."52 The
47. The uniqueness of public employment is not in the employees nor
in the work performed; the uniqueness is in the special character of the
employer. The employer is government; the ones who act on behalf of
the employer are public officials; and the ones to whom those officials
are answerable are citizens and voters.
Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Decisionmak-
ing, 44 U. CiN. L. REv. 669, 670 (1975).
48. The basic and bitter battle over the sovereignty issue, which so
long barred the way to acceptance of unionism in the public service,
has by no means been terminated with the now-widespread pattern of
recognition and written agreements .... [T] he battle... often moves
to the arena of the arbitrator and his scope of authority under the con-
tract arbitration clause.
Rehmus, supra note 10, at 283-84 (emphasis in original).
49. See Abrams, Negotiating in Anticipation of Arbitration: Some Guide-
posts for the Initiated, 29 CASE W. REs. 428, 429-30 (1979).
50. An arbitrator referred to the grievance arbitrator's customary role as
"gap filler" in City of Fairmount v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local 12811, 73
Lab. Arb. 1259, 1262 (1979) (Lubow, Arb.). The phrase is as unseemly as the
customary designation of the arbitrator as the "creature of the parties' collec-
tive bargaining agreement," see, e.g., City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., v. Mayfield,
Ohio Educ. Ass'n, 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1044, 1046-47 (1978) (Siegel, Arb.), but the
"gap filler" appellation does describe the function performed by both the pri-
vate and public sector grievance arbitrator.
51. See St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Sec-
ond Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 Mc. L. REV. 1137, 1138-44
(1977).
52. "The employers are generally loath to surrender their traditional pre-
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prevalence of the power issue therefore may be due to public
management's reluctance to cede control to arbitrators over the
establishment and administration of the terms and conditions
of employment of public workers. 3
Public sector collective bargaining is essentially a political
process. 54 Public officials are politically accountable for their
labor relation policies-and for other policies as well-at the
next election.5 5 An incumbent's continuation in office is depen-
dent upon his or her ability to accommodate the conflicting in-
terests of a heterogeneous constituency comprising taxpayers,
public service users, and providers of public services.56 This
rogative of determining conditions of employment and some are not yet
strongly committed to public employee collective bargaining." Anderson, Mac-
Donald & O'Reilly, Impasse Resolution in Public Sector Collective Bargaining-
An Examination of Compulsory Interest Arbitration in New York, 51 ST. JoHN's
L. REV. 453, 509 (1977). After discussing court decisions accepting grievance ar-
bitration as the preferred method of dispute resolution in the public sector, one
commentator concludes that "we have witnessed the nearly unabated loss of
control by the public body over the management of its affairs and... this as-
sault will continue." Vaccaro, Is Public Sector Grievance Arbitration Different
from the Private Sector: A Management Perspective, 7 J. L, & EDUC. 543, 552
(1978). He recommends "a more aggressive challenge" by management on
arbitrability issues to recapture "government prerogatives, authority and
power." Id. at 552-53.
53. This concern about the delegation of decisionmaking power to an ad
hoc neutral is the central focus of attacks on the constitutionality of binding in-
terest arbitration. See, e.g., Dearborn Firefighters Union Local No. 412 v. City of
Dearborn, 394 Mich. 229, 242-72, 231 N.W.2d 226, 228-43 (1975); Note, Binding In-
terest Arbitration in the Public Sector: Is It Constitutional? 18 WM. & MARy L
REv. 787, 797-804 (1977). Although the process of interest arbitration generally
has passed constitutional muster, the delegation argument still raises a consid-
erable policy question for designers of public sector labor relations schemes.
See generally Craver, The Judicial Enforcement of Public Sector Interest Arbi-
tration, 21 B.C.L. REv. 557, 561-68 (1980) (discussion of the common constitu-
tional challenges to public sector interest arbitration statutes).
54. "Collective bargaining in the public sector is 'political' in any meaning-
ful sense of the word." Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 257 (1977)
(Powell, J., concurring). Professor Clyde W. Summers has explored thoroughly
many implications of the political nature of public sector collective bargaining
in his seminal article, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective,
supra note 1. He does not address the impact of the political context on the
public sector grievance arbitration process, but the conclusions reached in this
essay are generally consistent with Summers's premise that labor relations in
the public sector are "shaped ... by political forces." Id. at 1156.
55. "We have developed a whole structure of constitutional and statutory
principles, and a whole culture of political practices and attitudes as to how
government is to be conducted, what powers public officials are to exercise, and
how they are to be made answerable for their actions." Summers, supra note
47, at 670.
56. 'The officials who represent the public employer are ultimately respon-
sible to the electorate, which for this purpose can be viewed as comprising
three overlapping classes of voters-taxpayers, users of particular government
services, and government employees." Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
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polycentric problem of responding to competing demands in a
manner that achieves a sufficient measure of constituent ap-
proval is solved by public officials through political means.57 In
negotiating with unions representing the employee-providers of
public services, public managers seek to achieve a cost and
service level commensurate with their countervailing obliga-
tions to those who use and pay for government operations. Of-
ficials are subject to lobbying and other exercises of political
pressure by groups not directly involved at the bargaining ta-
ble.58 A manager's failure to accommodate these conflicting
political demands can lead to his or her defeat at the polls.59
By comparison, labor arbitration decisionmaking is not a
political process; it is fundamentally ill-suited to achieve politi-
cally acceptable outcomes. Established principles of contract
interpretation, not political considerations, control the arbitra-
tor's decisions. 60 An arbitrator is inexperienced in the art of
political compromise; the purely adjudicative aspects of the ar-
bitrator's traditional role in resolving disputes do not include
the accommodation of constituent interests. 61 Furthermore,
209, 228 (1977). One commentator has suggested that retribution at the polls by
dissatisfied union members is the greatest threat to the public manager. Clark,
Politics and Public Employee Unionism= Some Recommendations for an
Emerging Problem, 44 U. Cmn. L. REV. 680, 682-83 (1975). Other than a few anec-
dotes, however, he supplies no empirical support for his theory. Id.
57. The problem, of course, may not always be solved. Officials do lose
elections. But the point is that public managers employ political strategies in
order to avoid that fate. See Haefele, A Utility Theory of Representative Gov-
ernmen4 61 Am. EcoN. REV. 350, 350-66 (1971).
58. See Cohen, Does Public Employee Unionism Diminish Democracy?, 32
INDus. & LAB. REL. REV. 189, 195 n.19 (1979).
59. As Professor Summers describes the political perspective, "Decision-
making in government ... is a highly complex process in which a variety of
procedures, structures, and pressures interact in countless permutations to
produce a decision. It is less principled than pragmatic, less an orderly system
than a patchwork of processes." Summers, supra note 1, at 1158.
60. See Abrams, supra note 6, at 564. As part of his defense of interest ar-
bitration, one commentator characterizes grievance arbitration as "an arm's
length adjudication" as compared with the "process of adjustment and accom-
modation" involved in interest arbitration. "In grievance ... arbitration, two
plus two equals four, or at least should equal four in most situations. But in
interest arbitration ... two plus two may equal three and a half, or five, or
seven, or nine or some other number-possibly four, but not likely." Anderson,
Arbitration and the Law: "A Better Way," 30 LAB. I.J. 259, 262 (1979). The vari-
able calculus of interest arbitration may very well be the result of political con-
siderations. The predictable addition of grievance arbitration is the result of
applying established principles of arbitral jurisprudence to the facts of the case
at hand.
61. In discussing interest arbitration, Arbitrator Peter Seitz points to the
deficiencies in evidence that make it difficult, if not impossible, for the neutral
to assume the "quintessentially governmental" function of "the allocation of
sparse public funds among services and needs of a community":
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the apolitical nature of arbitration decisionmaking inhibits
traditional opportunities available to constituent groups-in-
cluding other public sector unions-to influence policymaking
through political means.6 2 The public cannot lobby or threaten
an arbitrator with political retaliation.63 Although the resolu-
tion of grievance disputes does have an unavoidable political
impact,64 arbitrators lack sufficient information and expertise to
Although the city's case may include evidence concerning many mat-
ters, [the interest arbitrator] is not likely to have in that record a full
adversary showing as to the fiscal problems of the community; an eval-
uation, on a priority basis, of the claim in the case as compared with
allegedly essential services that might be affected thereby; a compari-
son of the relative inequities suffered by the ... unions whose con-
tracts were coming up for renegotiations; et cetera.
Seitz, The Gotterdammerung of Grievance Arbitration, 2 EmpiL REL L.J. 386,
394-95 (1977). While the grievance arbitrator does not enjoy the interest arbi-
trator's broad quasi-legislative charter in making allocative decisions, resolving
a single important dispute may have a broad impact on governmental resources
and policy choices. The public sector grievance arbitrator rarely is given
enough information to make those larger choices.
62. One might argue that grievance arbitration should be condemned
broadly as inconsistent with a democratic form of government. See R. DAHL, A
PREFACE TO DEMOcRATIC THEORY 145 (1956). Binding review power over per-
sonnel decisions exercised out of the public view by an unelected, unaccounta-
ble private person certainly sounds suspect. If one assumes, as a normative
premise, that "our political system should be structured to reflect the will of
the governed, as expressed through a pluralistic diffusion of interests, by al-
lowing for active and legitimate groups to make themselves heard during the
public decision processes," Feuille, supra note 45, at 71, then the apolitical
grievance arbitration process, insulated from nonparty input, might fail the
test. Compare Greeley Police Union v. City Council, 191 Colo. 419, 422-23, 553
P.2d 790, 792 (1976) (provision of constitutional amendment providing for bind-
ing arbitration between police and city held an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative authority) with Local 1226, Rhinelander City Employees' AFSCME
v. City of Rhinelander, 35 Wis. 2d 209, 220, 151 N.W.2d 30, 36 (1967) (binding ar-
bitration clause not an unlawful infringement on the legislative power of the
city). Court adjudication, equally insulated from the rough-and-tumble of lob-
bying politics, would also fail the test. An apolitical judicial system certainly is
viewed as consistent with our national political system.
63. Ex parte communications to the public sector arbitrator, of course, are
censurable acts for which a court can vacate a favorable ruling. Similarly,
threats of retaliation voiced in terms of the continued acceptability of the arbi-
trator are equally deplorable. The established protocols of labor arbitration do
not allow for the use of such traditional political tools. See Abrams, The Integ-
rity of the Arbitral Process, 76 MIcH. L. REV. 231, 244-51 (1977).
64. While most personnel matters-such as seniority, protection
against unjust disciplinary action, and scheduling of vacations-involve
limited issues of the kind that labor arbitrators are experienced in
resolving, in the public sector these can take on a political dimen-
sion.... [T]he political implications of a system that subjects such
disputes to binding decision by an arbitrator are... direct and sub-
stantial. It means that an arbitrator is to be given the political task of
assessing the impact of proposed rules on the interests of the broader
community as well as those of employees.
Grodin, Political Aspects of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 1 INDus. REL. L.J.
[Vol. 67:261
ARBITRATION
assess the political implications of their actions.65
The following three scenarios demonstrate the difference
between political decisionmaking by public officials and adjudi-
catory decisionmaking by grievance arbitrators:
1. The City discharges an employee after the local
newspaper reveals that the employee is an active
leader in the local branch of the American Nazi Party.
Representatives of citizens groups in the City have
called upon City officials to remove the worker from
the payroll. Although no proof exists that the em-
ployee's Nazi activities have interfered with job per-
formance, City officials are concerned about retaliation
at the polls. The employee's union contests the dis-
charge in arbitration. Assuming the collective bargain-
ing agreement requires "just cause" for discharge, a
grievance arbitrator probably would not uphold man-
agement's politically motivated decision on the basis of
private sector interpretations of that contract
1, 12-13 (1976). Although Professor Grodin's comments were directed toward
interest arbitration, they are equally applicable to the grievance arbitration
process.
65. Professor Eric Schmertz, an experienced and talented labor arbitrator,
has suggested a more expansive role for the grievance arbitrator as protector of
the public interest. In The Public Safety and Personnel Cuts in the New York
City Fire Department The Role of. the Impartial Chairman, 2 EMPL. REL L.J.
155 (1976), Schmertz defended his decision in City of New York Fire Dept. v.
Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 261 (1976) (Schmertz, Arb.),
which upheld the City's contractual right to reduce staffing levels in the Fire
Department, while enjoining further layoffs that the arbitrator determined
would endanger public and firefighter safety. Schmertz argues that the griev-
ance arbitrator must represent the public interest and welfare, since there is no
other forum ready to assume that role. Id. at 159. The State Supreme Court, on
review of Schmertz's decision, vacated that portion of the award barring the
city from future layoffs, ruling that such an award constituted an "intrusion
into the powers ... of the executive and usurpation of the legislative function."
Id. at 162.
The practical difficulty with the Schmertz model is not that certain exper-
ienced and wise arbitrators could not do a better job at protecting the public
interest than the parties to a collective agreement, but that the grievance arbi-
trator has no source of reliable information as to what that public interest is.
Cf. Seitz, supra note 61, at 394-95. The legal difficulty with the Schmertz model
is that no statute authorizes the public protector-grievance arbitrator model.
Schmertz reads the New York City collective bargaining law as contemplating
a new layer of public authority in the creation of an arbitration mechanism.
There is no indication, however, that the enabling legislation was designed to
accomplish this goal. Authorization of this expansive conception of the role of
the public grievance arbitrator would have to come through explicit legislative
grant, rather than through reliance on arguments addressed to the inescapable
necessity of this model.
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standard.66
2. City officials decide to lay off a number of City
workers to reduce taxes substantially before next
year's election. Although the City currently has
enough money to pay the existing work force, officials
believe that it is politically wiser to lower taxes. The
union contests the City's action in arbitration. Assum-
ing the City's decision fundamentally undermines the
integrity of the collective bargaining agreement, the
grievance arbitrator might very well censure the action
under established principles of adjudication developed
in the private sector.67
3. City officials decide to contract out a government
service. The reason for the decision-although not its
public justification-is to allow elected officials to pay
off a political debt to a crony. The union representing
the laid-off employees attacks the decision in arbitra-
tion. Assuming the collective bargaining agreement is
silent on the issue of subcontracting, an arbitrator, ap-
plying established private sector principles, would re-
view the reasonableness of management's action.68
Public management would defend its action on
grounds other than political spoils, but absent a show-
ing of some independent economic justification for the
decision, the arbitrator might grant the grievance.
The point to be emphasized is not that political decision-
making is better or worse than principled adjudicative decision-
making, but simply that the two processes are different. Since
the arbitration process is insulated from political pressure
orchestrated by public officials, public management has no op-
tion other than to raise the power issue in order to defend its
right to consider political factors in making decisions affecting
personnel. 69
66. See generally Abrams, A Theory for the Discharge Case, 36 ARB. J. 24
(1981).
67. Cf. City of Highland Park v. American Fed'n of State, County, & Mun.
Employees, Local 41, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 811, 817 (1981) (McDonald, Arb.)
(city's budget deficit does not justify reducing work week from five to four work
days).
68. See, e.g., Uniroyal, Inc. v. United Textile Workers of Am., Local 1800, 76
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1049, 1052-53 (1981) (Nolan, Arb.).
69. Marshalling political power may be useful in collective bargaining,
Summers, supra note 47, at 676-77, but that strategy is unavailing in persuading
a grievance arbitrator. Of course, complete disenchantment with the arbitra-
tion process, combined with adequate political muscle, ultimately could lead to
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The prevalence of the power issue in the public sector may
be the result of public management's concern that the arbitra-
tor will not, and cannot, render a judgment maximizing, or even
contemplating, political considerations. 7 0 Were the arbitrator
to administer his or her own brand of "political" justice, the
award certainly would be subject to judicial reversal.7 1 The
power issue stands as the public employer's front line of de-
fense against encroachment by the apolitical grievance arbitra-
tion process upon the essentially political nature of labor
relations decisionmaking in the public sector.
IV. IMPACT OF THE POWER ISSUE
Although this Article has identified some of the reasons
why the power issue arises so frequently in public sector griev-
ance arbitration, reaching broad normative judgments concern-
ing its effect on the arbitral mechanism is more difficult.
Conceivably, public management's routine invocation of the
power issue could undermine the effectiveness and legitimacy
of public sector arbitration. If that occurs, the public sector
would lose the salutary effect that the grievance arbitration
system has had on worker productivity and labor-management
relationships in the private sector.7 2 On the other hand, the ar-
bitration process is a flexible mechanism; it may be able to ab-
statutory revision and prohibition of arbitration. Such a result, however, is
unlikely.
70. Occasionally, a public employer will proffer a political justification for
its action. In City of Rockville, Md. v. American Fed'n of State, County, & Mun.
Employees, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 140, 141-42 (1981) (Levitan, Arb.), the city ar-
gued that "the discharge of the grievant was justified not only because he vio-
lated rules governing his employment, but it was essential in order to preserve
the public trust in the city government. . . ." While noting that city manage-
ment had adequately "convinced the citizenry" by its "vigorous action," Arbi-
trator Levitan set aside the discharge on the ground that the city had always
condoned such conduct in the past. Id. at 182.
71. See Craver, supra note 5, at 343.
72. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained some of the collateral
benefits of public sector arbitration in Pennsylvania Lab. Rel. Bd. v. Common-
wealth, 478 Pa. 582, 589, 387 A.2d 475, 478 (1978):
Binding arbitration renders the collective bargaining process more
meaningful to both the employer and the employee. It strengthens the
worker's confidence in the equity of the agreement by assuring that
disputes over its meaning will be resolved by a neutral third party; it
encourages more careful decisionmaking on the part of the public em-
ployer who knows that decisions will be subject to the scrutiny of an
impartial arbitrator whose decisions will be binding; and it creates
pressures to settle disputes at lower management levels.
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sorb the "slings and arrows" of the power-issue attack and
adapt to the public sector context.
Arbitrators are personally sensitive to attacks on their
power and do not want to be seen as usurpers, aggrandizing au-
thority not bestowed by the contracting parties. Chilled by
threats to their continued acceptability, some arbitrators might
be inclined to accept power arguments in inappropriate situa-
tions. The risk to the future of public sector arbitration would
then be substantial.73
The habitual invocation of the power issue can be criticized
on grounds of efficiency, at least in those cases where the issue
is raised without a legitimate contractual basis. Burdening the
arbitration process with spurious arguments of any kind is dys-
functional. On the other hand, raising even meritless power
questions might have a positive therapeutic effect for public
managers, much like the catharsis employees experience by ar-
guing frivolous claims to the private sector arbitrator.7 4 On bal-
ance, however, public management gains little in the long run
by raising worthless power issue claims in the increasingly ex-
pensive and time consuming arbitration procedure.75
Predicting future developments with regard to the preva-
lence of the power issue in public sector grievance arbitration
is exceedingly difficult. If the routine assertion of the power is-
sue is simply a product of the immaturity of public sector labor
relations systems, their continued development and increasing
stability should eliminate the habitual invocation of the issue.
The mere passage of time and the accumulation of labor rela-
tions experience, however, will not eliminate the more funda-
mental sources of the power issue. A complex matrix of
surrounding laws and judicial decisions will continue to bind
public bodies, and public managers will continue to raise the
power issue in arbitration in an attempt to discharge these co-
existing responsibilities. Public officials will remain obligated
to heterogeneous constituencies and may continue to believe
that apolitical decisionmaking cannot satisfy the political de-
mands of their offices. Thus, increased familiarity with the
73. '"There is little point in having arbitration if the arbitrator acts solely,
or primarily, as a rubber stamp for predetermined management decisions."
Grodin, supra note 64, at 9.
74. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.; 363 U.S. 564, 568 n.6 (1960).
75. See BULLETIN 1833, supra note 3, at 29, Veglahn, Arbitrations
Costs/Time: Labor and Management Views, 30 LAB. I.J. 49, 49-57 (1979) (labor
arbitration process is expensive and time consuming).
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processes of collective labor relations is unlikely to make pub-
lic management less disposed to raise the power issue.
In one important area, a shift is foreseeable in the determi-
nants contributing to the prevalence of the power issue in the
public sector. Experience with arbitration should engender a
greater degree of confidence in the men and women who ad-
minister the process as neutrals. In general, arbitrators are a
talented group of skilled adjudicators. To foster this confidence
and enhance the legitimacy of the arbitration mechanism, the
corps of arbitrators must develop a distinctive public sector ar-
bitral jurisprudence consistent with the special characteristics
of the arena. There is every reason to believe that public sector
arbitrators can meet this challenge. 76
The arbitrators' task is to develop a distinctive mode of
decisionmaking in harmony with the public sector context.
Since statutes and ordinances are often part of the record of a
public sector case,77 public sector arbitrators will have to per-
form the generally unfamiliar task of interpreting public law. 78
Managerial rights clauses and substantive benefit clauses will
have to be interpreted, to borrow Justice Reed's phrase, "With
as little destruction of one as is consistent with the mainte-
nance of the other."79 Creating a distinct public sector arbitral
jurisprudence does not mean establishing a set of principles
76. Referring to public sector grievance arbitration, Arbitrator Richard
Bloch recently stated, "The good news is that it will become more sophisti-
cated. The bad news is that it will have to be." Speech, Labor-Management Re-
lations Service, U.S. Conference of Mayors-American Arbitration Association
Conference, quoted in 897 Gov'T EmpL. REL. REP. (BNA) 16, 16 (1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Speech].
77. Statutes and ordinances often are incorporated expressly into the col-
lective agreements that arbitrators are asked to interpret and apply. See, e.g.,
Indiana Army Ammunition Plant v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, Local
1581, 64 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1021, 1024-25 (1975) (Render, Arb.).
78. A serious question has been raised concerning the ability of private
sector arbitrators to interpret the laws:
There is ... no reason to credit arbitrators with any competence, let
alone any special expertise, with respect to the law, as distinguished
from the agreement. [Many] arbitrators lack any legal training at all,
and even lawyer-arbitrators do not necessarily hold themselves out as
knowledgable about the broad range of statutory and administrative
materials that may be relevant in labor arbitrations.
Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law and Labor Relations, in NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS PROCEEDINGS OF THE TwENTIETH ANNUAL MEETING,
THE ARBrIRATOR, THE NLRB AND THE CoURTs 16 (D. Jones ed. 1967).
To serve well as adjudicators in the public sector, grievance arbitrators
must learn to interpret the law as well as they have learned to interpret the
contract. There is simply no way to avoid the task when statutory provisions
are part of the record of the case.
79. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956).
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under which public management wins every case. What it does
mean is that public sector arbitral decisionmaking must take
account of the fundamentally different context within which
the arbitral mechanism must operate.
Adapting the apolitical private sector grievance arbitration
system to the politically dominated labor relations system in
the public sector presents the most difficult challenge. Some
might suggest that accommodation to the political side of pub-
lic sector labor relations would taint the pristine atmosphere of
principled dispute resolution. Under this view, the nonpolitical
resolution of grievances is seen as a laudable characteristic of
private sector arbitration deserving protection at all costs in the
public sector.80 This view, however, ignores the essentially
political nature of grievance resolution in the public sector. To
remain blissfully ignorant of the political implications of the
process disserves the parties and undermines acceptability of
the process in the public sector.
While the dissonance between political and principled deci-
sionmaking cannot be ignored, the path of reconciliation is not
obvious. One alternative would be to enhance the political cre-
dentials of the grievance arbitrator through popular election or
through periodic appointment by a politically accountable
elected official. This strategy, however, would alter fundamen-
tally the adjudicatory nature of the process as now practiced.
Under this alternative, a grievance arbitrator would have a di-
rect or indirect constituency to consider in resolving disputes.
If the grievance arbitrator and the public employer shared the
same constituency, the arbitration process would lose its neu-
tral character.8 1 Even if this were not the case, a politi-
cian/arbitrator would lose any claim to objectivity. If, for
example, the grievance arbitrator were politically accountable
to a state-wide or regional constituency, the arbitrator might re-
solve disputes according to a set of political considerations dif-
fering materially from those of a particular local public
employer. Moreover, there is no indication that public employ-
ers-or public unions, for that matter-would prefer a system
80. But see Summers, supra note 47, at 672 ('"The major decisions made in
public employee bargaining not only are political, but in my view must be, and
ought to be, political.").
81. Professor Grodin rejects this solution to the problem of politically irre-
sponsible interest arbitrators because of its impact on the "neutral character"
of the arbitrator. Grodin, supra note 64, at 16. He adds that "to the extent that
the arbitrator's constituency is the same as the legislative body that would
otherwise exercise authority over the policy questions posed, the process be-
comes redundant." Id.
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in which grievance arbitrators play a purely political role in
resolving disputes. 82 The problem, therefore, is to preserve the
neutral and objective character of private sector grievance arbi-
tration, while recognizing that the system must operate within
a distinctive political context.
Unelected public sector arbitrators cannot substitute their
personal hierarchy of political values for those of elected offi-
cials, and the established protocols of grievance arbitration do
not allow for considering the political acceptability of an award
as a decisional norm. Nevertheless, public sector arbitrators do
have a source through which some political realities are re-
vealed: the public sector collective bargaining agreement, a
product of a political accommodation of conflicting interests.
The agreement, read in light of the political context within
which it was negotiated, must stand as the definitive and unal-
terable text in the public arena. By exercising a full measure of
self-restraint, the public sector arbitrator can remain true to
that political bargain. Expansive principles of grievance resolu-
tion developed in the private sector should not be imported
wholesale into the public sector without careful consideration
of their relevance. A distinctive public sector arbitral jurispru-
dence with decisional principles finely tuned to the context
should be the arbitrator's best guide to resolving grievance dis-
putes in the public sector.83
82. Robert Coulson, President of the American Arbitration Association, re-
cently stated with regard to interest arbitration, "Parties do not trust even the
best motivated, most sophisticated of labor arbitrators to stumble around in
their collective cabbage patch, dispensing personal concepts of industrial jus-
tice." Speech, supra note 76, at 14. A grievance arbitrator dispensing personal
concepts of political wisdom would be equally unappealing. Given the choice,
it appears unlikely that parties would opt for purely political decisionmaking
over principled grievance adjudication.
83. The public sector arbitrator also must recognize the distinctive charac-
ter of some of the functions performed in the public service and absorb them
into the process of dispute resolution. For example, while no arbitrator in the
private sector would uphold a disciplinary suspension of an employee for fail-
ure to wear a uniform hat while off duty, a public officer's cap and uniform
serve "special purposes." City of Erie, Pa. v. Fraternal Order of Police, Hass
Memorial Lodge, 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 605, 606 (1979) (Kreimer, Arb.). In City of
Erie, the arbitrator upheld a five-day disciplinary suspension of a law officer
who failed to wear his uniform hat off duty, recognizing that "[a] police force is
a quasi-military organization which differentiates it from the usual industrial or
governmental group of workers." Id. Accord City of Rochester, Mich. v. City of
Rochester Police Employees, Local 3075, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 295, 299 (1981)
(Lipson, Arb.). But see Adjutant Gen. v. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees,
Local R8-22, 77 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 203, 207 (1981) (ipson, Arb.) Similarly,
in State Univ. v. Civil Serv. Employees Ass'n, Inc., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 299, 301
(1980) (Babiskin, Arb.), which upheld the termination of an employee for sell-
ing drug capsules to an undercover agent on campus, the arbitrator could not
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Returning to the three grievance scenarios discussed
above, a public sector arbitrator should respond to such griev-
ances in a way that both respects the political nature of public
sector labor relations and also protects the neutrality and ob-
jectivity of the arbitration process:
1. The arbitration should review the discharge of
the public worker for activity on behalf of the Ameri-
can Nazi Party under a distinctly public sector gloss of
what is meant by "just cause."84 The arbitrator should
consider not only the first amendment implications of
the termination,85 but also the government's right to
exclude from public service those whose conduct raises
serious questions about their loyalty to the established
form of government. 86
2. The layoff of City workers to allow for a reduc-
tion of taxes would violate no express provision of the
"ignore the special responsibility the State University has to its students and
their parents." Id. See also City of Wilkes-Barre v. International Bhd. of Team-
sters, Local 401, 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 33, 36 (1980) (Dunn. Arb.) (city employee
could not be discharged for drug use if it did not interfere with job perform-
ance).
On the other hand, the public sector arbitrator must not confuse self-re-
straint with obeisance to managerial pronouncements. In a scholarly and
thoughtful opinion setting aside the termination of a public employee for
"whistle-blowing," one arbitrator reminded the public employer, "A citizen
does not lose his rights as a citizen simply because he goes to work for the gov-
ernment." Town of Plainsville, Conn. v. American Fed'n of State, County &
Mun. Employees, Local 1303, 77 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 161, 170 (1980) (Sacks, Arb.).
84. For example, the arbitrator applied a distinctly public sector gloss on
the 'Just cause" standard in Delaware River Port Auth. v. Independent Bridge
Workers, 76 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 350 (1981) (Raffale, Arb.). The Authority had dis-
charged a toll collector for seriously assaulting a motorist after the motorist
spit at him. Noting that "spitting is serious provocation," the arbitrator stated
that a discharge would be too severe a penalty were the employer not "a public
institution and. . ., consequently, responsible for public safety in those areas
under its jurisdiction." Id. at 354.
The reaction of the public to the outrage committed by the employee is
a valid standard for determining just cause. The public is unlikely to
tolerate a public authority treating with restraint any atrocity commit-
ted on an individual member of the public, no matter what the provoca-
tion .... The idea that the public should react differently is irrelevant.
The reaction of the public is relevant when dealing with an organiza-
tion accountable to the public.
Id. at 355. But see City of Portland Bureau of Police v. Portland Police Ass'n, 77
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 820, 830 (1981) (Axon, Arb.). (arbitrator rejects public man-
agement's argument that discharge of policemen was warranted because of ef-
fect on "public trust and confidence").
85. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Murray v.
Jamison, 333 F. Supp. 1379, 1381-82 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
86. Cf. Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972) (requirement that employ-
ees take oath to uphold U.S. Constitution is constitutional).
[Vol. 67:261
ARBITRATION
collective agreement. Therefore, considering the con-
tract as the controlling guide, the arbitrator should re-
spect the literal terms of the parties' agreement and
deny the grievance.8 7
3. The subcontracting of a governmental function
to a political crony violates no express contract prohibi-
tion. Under this suggested model of the arbitrator's ap-
propriate role in resolving public sector disputes, the
arbitrator should deny the grievance.8 8 While this out-
come may sound unappealing, redress might be avail-
able in other fora. The subcontract may violate state
law, and a criminal action may lie against the responsi-
ble public officials. In any case, the electorate will hold
the public officers politically accountable for their deci-
sion. A public sector arbitrator's role is only to inter-
pret and apply the collective agreement, not to right all
public wrongs through an institution ill-designed to
achieve such a goal.89
V. CONCLUSION
One cannot conclude that public management is wrong in
raising the power issue. The power issue is the natural and
foreseeable result of adopting arbitration as the means of
87. A public sector union could bargain for a contract clause expressly re-
stricting management's right to lay off workers, assuming the prevailing law of
the jurisdiction makes the issue a mandatory subject of bargaining. An express
contract prohibition should be enforced in arbitration. Cf. Yonkers Fed'n of
Teachers v. Board of Educ., 44 N.Y.2d 752, 753, 376 N.E.2d 1326, 1327, 405 N.Y.S.2d
681, 682 (1978) (court compels arbitration of grievance raised under express
clause concerning job security).
88. Again, an express contract prohibition on subcontracting would man-
date the granting of the grievance.
89. Professor Grodin has suggested that interest arbitration decisions
should be subjected to "[s]ome form of meaningful review ... to ensure" that
the bounds set by law on the interest arbitrator's power "are not overstepped."
Grodin, supra note 64 at 21. See also Comment, Judicial Review of Labor Arbi-
tration Awards Under Pennsylvania's Public Employee Relations Ac4 83 Dicy.
L. REV. 795, 816 (1979) (because the public interest is directly implicated as a
result of the wide-reaching effects of an arbitrator's decision in a public sector
grievance arbitration, a broad standard of court review is appropriate). While
judicial review of grievance arbitration decisions can serve to check overreach-
ing by arbitrators, courts cannot act on a regular basis as a substitute forum for
the input of political considerations into the resolution of grievance disputes.
The courts, even when operated by popularly elected judges, are institutionally
incapable of ad hoc political decisionmaking. Cf. San Antonio Indep. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1973) ("[Tlhe ultimate solutions must come
from the lawmakers and from the democratic pressures of those who elect
them.").
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resolving labor disputes in the public sector. Grievance arbitra-
tion must therefore be tailored to the distinctive task at hand-
the resolution of disputes between the government and a union
representing public workers. The process will flourish in the
public sector only if grievance arbitrators appreciate the rea-
sons for the prevalence of the power issue and accommodate
the distinctive needs of the public sector. Public enterprise,
and the public it serves, will benefit from a successful reconcili-
ation of the principled decisionmaking of the arbitration pro-
cess and the political decisionmaking inherent in the public
sector labor relations system.
